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LARRY E. RIBSTEIN* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the law of closely held firms from an 
evolutionary perspective.  The corporate tax and constraints on the 
availability of limited liability forced closely held firms to compro­
mise their planning objectives and choose standard forms that did 
not fully reflect their needs.  These planning problems forced courts 
to construct duties and remedies that did not relate to the parties’ 
contracts.  The famous close corporation case of Wilkes v. Spring-
side Nursing Home, Inc.1 classically illustrates this problem. The 
advent and spread of the limited liability company significantly in­
creased the availability of suitable standard forms for closely held 
firms.  As a result, courts now can focus on fully effectuating the 
parties’ contracts rather than creating remedies the parties may not 
have wanted.  This analysis has implications for potential improve­
ments in contracting for closely held firms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Business associations are complex and long-term contracts for 
which detailed planning is inherently difficult.  Statutes and flexible 
judicial gap-filling often supplement explicit contracts in this con­
text.2  The development of business association statutes depends 
on the general legal and economic environment over time. The 
availability of improved statutes, in turn, affects both the parties’ 
contracts and the nature of appropriate judicial remedies. 
The most significant changes in the law of business associations 
over the last thirty years relate to small firms.  During this period, 
business forms for closely held firms evolved from the general part­
nership and close corporation to the dominance of the flexible lim­
ited liability form.3  Closely held firms had to choose between the 
higher transaction costs of these earlier forms and the higher tax or 
liability costs of standard forms better tailored to small firms’ 
needs.4  This compromise compounded the inherent problems of 
high-cost customized planning in small firms. As a result, small 
firms became wards of the courts, with judges rewriting their 
agreements.5 
2. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 15-38 (2010) (dis­
cussing the role and function of business association law). 
3. A recent study shows that in 2007 approximately two-thirds of business forma­
tions were LLCs. See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs are the New King of the Hill: An 
Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the 
United States Between 2004-2007 and How LLCs were Taxed for Tax Years 2002-2006, 
15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 460 (2010). 
4. RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, 95-117.	 R 
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The 1997 “check-the-box” tax rules6 set in motion a fundamen­
tal change in closely held firms. These rules freed small firms to 
adopt standard forms that suited their needs and motivated state 
legislatures to modify their laws accordingly. The resulting explo­
sion of statutes and private contracts reshaped small firms and 
changed the courts’ role in adjudicating cases involving these firms. 
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.7 illustrates the 
changes in the law of closely held firms. The Massachusetts Su­
preme Judicial Court confronted businessmen whose contract was 
hopelessly unsuited to their business relationship.  Like many other 
small firms of the time, this was a partnership wrapped in a corpo­
ration.  Although the firm had all the trappings of a coequal rela­
tionship among active participants, it lacked the partnership 
mechanism for resolving the disputes that inevitably arise in such a 
relationship.  The court had to decide between leaving the parties 
to stew in their imperfect planning and rescuing them by rewriting 
their agreement.  The court did the latter, creating confusion for 
business people but delight for generations of law professors. 
This Article discusses the coming of age of small firms in three 
distinct stages marked by important legal developments which re­
duced small firms’ contracting costs and increased their opportunity 
to adopt suitable agreements.  In the first stage, most closely held 
firms were general partnerships, a form that is designed for the 
smallest firms. 
In the second stage, the growing importance of limited liability 
caused many small firms to incorporate while keeping their partner­
ship characteristics. Wilkes shows that this was an unhappy com­
promise that necessitated judicial intervention into the parties’ 
contracts.  While courts and legislatures loosened the constraints on 
the close corporation form, this loosening did little to help firms 
like the nursing home in Wilkes because it required small firms to 
do costly planning in order to remodel the corporate form to suit 
their needs.  The application of the corporate tax to corporate-like 
firms deterred firms and legislatures from taking the logical step of 
adopting limited liability business forms designed for partnership-
type firms. 
The third stage was heralded by the adoption of “check-the­
box” taxation, which finally eliminated the tax constraints on small 
firms’ choice of business form.  This change opened the floodgates 
6. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to 2 (1960). 
7. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). 
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for the limited liability company (LLC), which proved to be the 
flexible limited liability form small firms were looking for.  Small 
firms could have the contracts they wanted without tax concerns. 
This reduced the need for judicial interference in the governance of 
closely held firms and led to the application of more contract-based 
judicial remedies. 
As we will see, the next step is up to lawyers, courts, and legis­
latures.  Lawyers need to help their clients take advantage of the 
planning flexibility the law now gives them.  Courts should more 
explicitly recognize the contractual nature of remedies for oppres­
sion and deadlock.  Public and private lawmakers need to provide 
business people with a more complete set of standard forms. 
This Article begins by discussing the small firm’s infancy as a 
general partnership, whose default rules suited only the very small­
est firms.  Part II discusses the small firm’s adolescence in the era of 
the close corporation, when firms had to choose between limited 
liability and the contractual freedom available to general partner­
ships.  Part III discusses the small firm’s adulthood as limited liabil­
ity companies, with the ability to choose from a range of standard 
forms and state laws.  The Article then shows how this evolution of 
business forms has affected judicial dissolution remedies in recent 
LLC cases.  Part V discusses the implications of potential future 
evolution in small firms’ contracting technology. 
I. INFANCY: GENERAL PARTNERSHIP 
The earliest small firms were partnerships, which began as inti­
mate, usually family, relationships.8  They were referred to as “com­
pagnia,” which means those sharing bread, reflecting their origins in 
households.9  Kinship ties were an important mechanism for con­
trolling agency costs.  As Kerim Bey told James Bond in From Rus­
sia with Love, “all of my key employees are my sons.  Blood is the 
best security in this business.”10  Partnership law reflects this inti­
macy in several ways.11  First, each partner is vicariously liable for 
8. See Avner Greif, The Study of Organizations and Evolving Organizational 
Forms through History: Reflections from the Late Medieval Family Firm, 5 INDUS. & 
CORP. CHANGE 473, 476 n.2 (1996). 
9. See id. at 489; Meir G. Kohn, Business Organization in Pre-Industrial Europe 
33, (Dartmouth Coll. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper 03-09, 2003), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=427744. 
10. Memorable Quotes for From Russia with Love, THE  INTERNET  MOVIE 
DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0057076/quotes (last visited Jan. 23, 2010). 
11. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 39-64. R 
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all of the firm’s debts.  This liability, which is imposed irrespective 
of the partnership agreement, reinforces the need for intimacy and 
the other rights discussed below. 
Second, partnership default rules are designed for the smallest 
firms, with provisions for equality in profit and loss sharing,12 vot­
ing,13 and partners’ power to block important acts14 and to bind the 
firm.15 
Third, traditional partnership fiduciary duties reflect partner­
ship’s intimacy.  In the famous case of Meinhard v. Salmon, Justice 
Cardozo described the partner’s duty as “the punctilio of an honor 
the most sensitive.”16  The court’s application of the duty to the 
defendant under the facts of that case—that is, for failing to include 
plaintiff in a much bigger deal the defendant was offered because of 
his superior skills—seems to assume the sort of close-knit relation­
ship in which the parties share everything like brothers. 
Fourth, partners have no default power to transfer their man­
agement rights in the partnership without their co-partners’ con­
sent.17  This follows from partners’ default management rights and 
vicarious liability, since partners would want to control who holds 
these strong powers. 
Fifth, the Uniform Partnership Act allows any partner to dis­
solve a partnership that has no remaining agreed term simply by 
expressing the will to do so or dissociating from the firm.18  When 
this happens the partnership liquidates.19  Even if the partnership 
has a remaining agreed term, it can still be dissolved and forced to 
liquidate by any partner other than one who acted wrongfully 
(under the original U.P.A.)20 or by half the remaining partners 
(under the Revised U.P.A.).21  Partnership law further encourages 
dissolution and liquidation by traditionally restricting inter-partner 
litigation to an accounting, which typically happens only at dissolu­
tion.22  These rules leave partners subject to the risk that their co­
12. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(b) (1997); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(a) (1914). 
13. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(f); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(e). 
14. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401 (j); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(h). 
15. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 301; UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 9.  
16. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
17. See REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 503; UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 26, 27. 
18. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801; UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 31. 
19. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 807; UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 38. 
20. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 38(2). 
21. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801(2). 
22. The accounting is provided for in UNIF. P’SHIP  ACT § 28.  The rule that the 
accounting is the exclusive remedy is a case law development. See 2 ALAN R. BROM­
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partners will use the dissolution power to walk off with valuable 
skills and assets. For example, in Page v. Page a managing brother 
used dissolution to essentially take the business from his brother 
who had invested heavily in it and was only just beginning to see a 
payoff.23  This risk of opportunism is justified by a strong assump­
tion that the parties did not expect the firm to survive serious disa­
greement, litigation, or member departure. 
Although the above default rules are appropriate only for the 
smallest and most intimate firms, many small firms consist of arms’ 
length relationships and some passive investors. These firms need a 
business form better suited to their needs, particularly including 
limited liability and greater continuity.  As we will see in the next 
part, firms seeking limited liability traditionally have been chan­
neled into the corporate form, which poses different but equally 
daunting problems for small firms. 
II. ADOLESCENT IDENTITY CRISIS: THE CLOSE CORPORATION 
Small firms seeking to leave the intimacy contemplated by gen­
eral partnership law and venture into the world needed a different 
legal vehicle.  The corporate form’s limited liability became increas­
ingly valuable as firms’ tort liabilities expanded during the twenti­
eth century.  But the corporation was designed for large firms, with 
features such as significant separation between management and 
ownership, complex capital structures, and publicly tradable 
shares.24  The closely held corporation was a contradiction in terms, 
as its nickname “incorporated partnership” suggests.25  Even 
closely held firm owners dissatisfied with the intimacy of the part­
nership form did not necessarily want to go to the other extreme of 
corporate-type boards of directors and formal shareholder meet­
ings.  These people needed a limited liability firm that combined 
partnership and corporate aspects under the partnership heading. 
Although states were free to develop such statutes, they did 
not do so. Tax law helps explain why.  A firm taxed as a corpora­
tion under Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code has to pay 
taxes at the firm level when it earns income and at the owner level 
when it distributes the income as dividends.26  A partnership taxed 
BERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON  PARTNERSHIP, § 6.08(c) 
(2011). 
23. Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 42 (Cal. 1961). 
24. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 65-75. R 
25. See id. at 96. 
26. I.R.C. § 301 (2006). 
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under Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code could avoid a 
separate tax on entity-level income because it was not a separate 
entity for tax purposes.27  This was usually better than the “double” 
corporate tax, especially for closely held partnership-type firms that 
tend to distribute most of their cash to the owners.28  But partner­
ships that adopted limited liability were stuck with the corporate 
tax.  The “Kintner regulations,”29 which defined what the tax code 
called “associations,”30 subjected firms to the corporate tax if they 
had certain supposed entity characteristics, including limited liabil­
ity.31  As the IRS applied the regulations, the corporate tax became 
essentially a tax on limited liability.32 
These tax rules left limited liability firms with little demand for 
“limited liability partnership”-type business forms.  If the firms 
were going to be taxed as corporations, they might be better off 
with standard entity features, such as separation of management 
and control to manage retained earnings and continuity of life, to 
protect against taxable distributions of these earnings.  In any 
event, small firm owners could limit the tax costs of incorporation 
by maximizing their tax deductions.  The fact that corporate tax 
rates were lower than individual rates mitigated the effect of the 
remaining double corporate tax.  The lack of demand for the lim­
ited liability partnership gave state legislatures little incentive to 
supply it. 
Congress also actively channeled small firms into the corporate 
form by enacting Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code in 
1958, which enabled small corporations to get many of the tax ad­
vantages of partnership.33  Congress significantly loosened the re­
27. Id. § 701. 
28. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 96. R 
29. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (2004).  These were named for the case of United 
States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). 
30. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (“[T]he term ‘corporation’ includes associations 
. . . .”); id. § 7701(a)(2) (definition of “partnership”). 
31. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 100. R 
32. See 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (Nov. 17, 1980) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301) 
(announcing that any firm would be classified as a corporation if all of its members have 
limited liability).  The rule was withdrawn two years later. IRS News Release, Dec. 16, 
1982; I.R.S. Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 30 (Jan. 14, 1983). However, the IRS 
issued a private letter ruling classifying an LLC as a corporation, before announcing 
that it would not issue further private rulings concerning LLC classification. Compare 
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-04-138 (Oct. 29, 1982), with Rev. Proc. 83-15, 1983-1 C.B. 676 
(1983). 
33. See I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379. 
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quirements in 198234 and 199635 while, at the same time, states were 
making the limited partnership a viable alternative to incorpora­
tion, the consequences of partnership taxation were becoming more 
favorable, and political pressure was increasing to abandon the sep­
arate corporate tax.36  Subchapter S attempts to keep small firms in 
the corporate fold by offering them a simple and straightforward 
alternative to the complexities of Subchapter K.37  Subchapter S’s 
one-class-of-stock requirement38 restricts these corporations from 
using complex capital structures that could enable high tax bracket 
owners to shift income to those in lower tax brackets. 
Courts also accommodated the close corporation form.  After 
initially refusing to adjust corporate norms to fit closely held firms, 
courts took account of the increasing number of close corporations 
and started to enforce their agreements.39  But closely held firms 
faced limits in the extent to which they could remodel the corporate 
form.  For example, Clark v. Dodge enforced an agreement eroding 
the power of a board to decide on distributions and who would be 
the firm’s general manager, but only because the board retained 
some power to determine whether the manager was providing good 
service and dividends were appropriate.40  Also, courts were willing 
to enforce a shareholder voting agreement that departed a little 
from corporate-style one share one vote,41 but not one that looked 
too much like a statutory voting trust.42 
34. See Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 
(1982). 
35. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1301, 
110 Stat. 1755 (1996) (codified at I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)) (raising the number of permissi­
ble members from 35 to 75).  The statute was further amended in 2004 to increase the 
number from 75 to 100.  American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub.L. 108-357, § 232(a), 
118 Stat. 1418 (2004) (codified at I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A)). 
36. See Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate 
Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325, 342-47 (1995); Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory 
of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 889, 940 (2006) (noting that Subchapter S 
“narrowed the base of companies subject to the separate corporate tax rather than 
threatening the system itself”). 
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (2004); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, 
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 17:3 (2d ed. 2008). 
38. I.R.C. § 1361 (b)(1)(D). 
39. See Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of Cor­
poration Law, 5 BERK. BUS. L.J. 263, 292 (2008). 
40. Clark v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641 (1936). 
41. Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 49 A.2d 
603 (Del. 1946). 
42. Abercrombie v. Davies, 130 A.2d 338 (Del. 1957). 
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Despite the courts’ and Uncle Sam’s best efforts to herd closely 
held firms into the corporate corral, the close corporation ulti­
mately was an evolutionary dead end. The problem came in deal­
ing with agreements that did not fully anticipate the problems that 
arose on breakup or exit.  Enforcing partnership-type direct control 
by individual members or factions creates a need for partnership-
type mechanisms for settling the inevitable disputes among mem­
bers.  Yet close corporations that failed to plan for breakup were 
stuck with corporate default rules that locked feuding members into 
a permanent entity without hope of selling their shares on the open 
market or enabled a controlling faction to force a frozen-in owner 
to sell out at a bargain price. 
Although courts at first held they had no inherent power to 
dissolve in these situations, legislatures amended the statutes to 
give courts this power.43  Then the courts had to decide individual 
cases.  The problem for the courts is that there are both costs and 
benefits of enabling members to exit firms, and the balance de­
pends on particular firms’ needs.  Statutes can do no more than pro­
vide default rules that at least roughly fit many firms’ expectations 
and that provide suitable platforms for contracting.  Default rules 
cannot precisely anticipate the needs of the range of firms that do 
not have contracts.  More importantly, it is not clear what a firm 
wants when it decides to be a corporation but looks like a partner­
ship.  This leaves close corporations that do not have agreements 
even worse off than partnerships that do not have agreements. 
The freeze-out scenario illustrates the problems of close corpo­
rations.  We have seen that the partnership feature of dissolution­
at-will may enable a partner to opportunistically seize value that co­
partners help create.44  Partnership statutes craft a rough compro­
mise that lets partners escape most partnerships while providing for 
continuity in partnerships for an agreed term.45  In this situation 
partners are particularly likely to have investments tied up in the 
firm.  It is much less clear what the parties to a close corporation 
wanted when the corporation statute simultaneously tells the par­
ties they lack the power to exit at will but then empowers courts to 
allow exit in some cases.  An early commentator praised a court 
that denied dissolution where opportunism might have been a prob­
43. See Carlos Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence, Problems of 
Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. CHI.  L.  REV. 778 (1952). 
44. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. R 
45. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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lem.46  But the parties may not have wanted to be locked together 
in the firm either. 
State close corporation law has advanced from its earliest days, 
particularly regarding break-up, and particularly by enactment of 
statutes like that in New York, which lets holders of 20% or more 
of the corporation’s shares petition for dissolution for looting, 
waste, or “illegal, fraudulent or oppressive actions” by those in con­
trol.47 In re Kemp & Beatley permitted dissolution under this provi­
sion where close corporation managers denied distributions to 
former employees that had formerly been given to all shareholders 
because this frustrated their “reasonable expectations.”48 
The oppression remedy, as applied in cases like Kemp & 
Beatley, arguably improves on the remedies available at the time of 
Wilkes.49  However, the remedy does not significantly alleviate the 
essential indeterminacy inherent in firms that are neither quite cor­
porations nor partnerships.  The problem is that it is not clear what 
shareholders reasonably expect when neither the statute nor the 
agreement provides for dissolution.  Should shareholders get spe­
cial rights just because they are also employees, or should employ­
ees get special rights because they are also shareholders?50  Should 
owners who are former employees be entitled to distributions just 
because everybody got them when everybody was both a share­
holder and an employee?  Does it matter that making payments to 
non-employees could cause all of the firm’s payouts to be character­
ized as taxable dividends rather than tax-deductible salaries?  Did 
the shareholders expect a buyout in this situation?  If not, should 
the buyout price reflect continuation of distributions?  Given these 
ambiguities, a dissolution standard based on the parties’ “reasona­
ble expectations” invites courts to make up contracts for the par­
ties.  This problem is not helped by statutory provisions permitting 
46. See Abram Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1532, 1546-47 (1960). 
47. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW. § 1104–a (McKinney 2003). 
48. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1180-81 (N.Y. 1984). 
49. See Robert A. Thompson, Allocating the Roles for Contract and Judges in the 
Closely Held Firm, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 369 (2011). 
50. Five years after Kemp, the New York Court of Appeals refused to give a 
cause of action for improper termination to a fired employee who was also a minority 
shareholder and was paid pursuant to his employment agreement. See Ingle v. 
Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1312-13 (N.Y. 1989). The court reasoned 
that “[i]t is necessary in this case to appreciate and keep distinct the duty a corporation 
owes to a minority shareholder as a shareholder from any duty it might owe him as an 
employee.” Id. at 1313.  A strong dissent relied on Kemp, as well as Pace and Wilkes 
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parties opposing dissolution to buy out the plaintiff at fair value,51 
since it is not clear why the plaintiff should be entitled to exit just 
because he sues, or on what assumptions the court should base its 
determination of “fair value.” 
The indeterminacy of close corporation law is especially evi­
dent when the oppression remedy meets an actual contract. For 
example, in In re Pace Photographers, Ltd., the parties agreed that 
a stockholder who “desires to sell his shares” could sell to the other 
stockholders at a below-market formula price. 52  Petitioner sued to 
dissolve for oppression and his co-shareholders offered to buy peti­
tioner’s stock for the agreed price pursuant to the New York provi­
sion.53  The court held that the contractual buyout provision only 
applied to a voluntary offer to sell or shareholder death and not to 
a statutory dissolution proceeding in the absence of explicit lan­
guage to that effect.54  Plaintiff therefore could avoid the buyout 
price by suing for dissolution rather than offering his shares for 
sale.55  Although the provision’s interaction with the statute was 
ambiguous, the court compounded the problem by making little ef­
fort to reconcile the two.56 
At least in the above New York cases, the parties might be said 
to have implicitly adopted the statutory remedy. Things get messier 
in a state like Massachusetts which lacks such a provision.  In the 
famous Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., the court allowed a mi­
nority holder the same opportunity for a buyout that the controlling 
shareholder got in connection with an estate planning reshuffling of 
interests.57  It is not clear why a 20% holder who declined to invest 
in the business should get the same opportunity as the controlling 
shareholder who had invested and run the business, particularly 
where there was neither an agreement that entitled the minority 
holder to this valuable right of being able to “tag along” with the 
majority owner’s sale, nor a statute providing for judicial 
dissolution. 
This brings us to the follow-up to Donahue, Wilkes v. Spring-
side Nursing Home, Inc., which involved a situation similar to 
Kemp—that is, a former employee who claims to have been shut 
51. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW. § 1118. 
52. In re Pace Photographers, Ltd., 525 N.E.2d 713, 714 (N.Y. 1988). 
53. Id. at 715. 
54. Id. at 718. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 717-18. 
57. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 520-21 (Mass. 1975). 
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out of employment and other benefits that he expected from his 
investment.58 Wilkes involved even harder facts than Kemp since, 
while Gardstein quit, Wilkes was fired, apparently without cause.59 
Moreover, the parties seem to have thought harder in Wilkes about 
what their deal was—they clearly wanted to be partners, and were 
incorporated only for liability reasons.60  In other words, they 
squarely faced the classic tradeoff between limited liability and 
partnership discussed above. 
Whatever the parties in Wilkes might subjectively have wanted, 
what they did was incorporate,which seemingly subjected them to 
the corporate statute.  The result was the structural dissonance of a 
“partnership” in corporate form.  This is a hybrid business associa­
tion with no clear default rules.  For example, if this firm really was 
a partnership, Wilkes could have sued for dissolution as an ex­
cluded partner rather than being left with only a suit for back pay.61 
If it was not, then Wilkes at that time in Massachusetts had no stat­
utory remedy.  The parties could not even have counted on the 
Donahue rule, since that case was decided only a year before 
Wilkes.62  As in Donahue, the court spun a contract out of gossa­
mer expectations, and gave Wilkes the salary he would have made 
had he stayed employed.63  Wilkes’s status as a shareholder some­
how also got him a guarantee of employment even without a con­
tract to that effect.64 
States tried to improve the close corporation contracting tech­
nology by enacting special statutes that explicitly validated partner-
ship-type agreements in close corporations.65  Small firms might 
have been expected to gravitate to these provisions, particularly 
once courts used the statutes to develop a special jurisprudence that 
58. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Mass. 
19876). 
59. Id. at 661. 
60. Id. at 659. 
61. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 22, § 7.06(c) (discussing types of mis­
conduct that can serve as a ground of judicial dissolution in general partnerships). 
62. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 505. 
63. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 665. 
64. Indeed, Deborah DeMott’s contribution to this symposium characterizes 
Wilkes as changing the traditional default rule of employment at will. See Deborah A. 
DeMott, Investing in Work: Wilkes as an Employment Law Case, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 497 (2011). 
65. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 341–356 (2001); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. 
& ASS’NS §§ 4–101 to 4–603 (LexisNexis 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-31 (2009); 
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differed from corporations.66  But this did not happen.  Small firms 
wanted to be real partnerships rather than ersatz partnerships in 
corporate form.  Despite the special close corporation provisions 
and the structural similarities between close corporations and part­
nerships, general corporation law arguably still applied to small cor­
porations that did not contract explicitly or that failed to elect and 
qualify under the close corporation provisions.67  Some courts have 
had a hard time accepting this. They continue to analogize close 
corporations to partnerships, though it is not clear what this 
means.68  They still do not trust the parties’ choices even as these 
choices become more explicit. For example, Zion v. Kurtz held that 
a corporation could qualify for Delaware’s special close corporation 
treatment even if it failed to make the requisite statutory election.69 
Few firms ultimately opted for special close corporation sta­
tus.70  Small firms recognized that these statutes were an uneasy 
compromise because, whether or not the firms were essentially 
partnerships, they faced costs as long as they were called corpora­
tions, “close,” or otherwise.  The expectations of firms that oper­
ated in the corporate form never quite matched the default 
agreement the legislation supplied, and the courts could not fill this 
gap.  As discussed in the next section, small firms fled the corporate 
form altogether as soon as the tax laws were changed to eliminate 
the need for compromise. 
III. FINDING A ROLE MODEL: THE LLC 
The migration to LLCs that transformed the closely held firm 
began with tax reform in the 1980s.71  By the mid-1980s only two 
states (Wyoming in 1977 and Florida in 1982) had adopted LLC 
66. See Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 365 (1992). 
67. For cases denying judicial remedies designed for closely held firms that did 
not elect to be treated as statutory close corporations see Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 
1366, 1379-81 (Del. 1993); Toner v. Balt. Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642, 653-54 (Md. 
1985). 
68. See Pappas v. Fotinos, No. 7799/04, 2010 WL 2891194, at *12-13 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. July 23, 2010); Larry E. Ribstein, A Corporation is not a Partnership, TRUTH ON THE 
MARKET (Aug. 2, 2010), http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/08/02/a-corporation-is-not­
a-partnership/. 
69. Zion v. Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681, 682 (N.Y. 1980). 
70. See F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S 
CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.20 (2008); Wells, supra note 
39, at 279-81 (discussing data on close corporation formations). 
71. Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Exter­
nalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.79, 86-87 (2001). 
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statutes.72  But three events helped change the political equilib­
rium.73  First, the Tax Reform Act of 198674 reduced top individual 
tax rates below top corporate tax rates and eliminated favorable 
capital gains treatment, thereby making corporate taxation costly 
for almost all firms.75 
Second, Georgia’s 1988 passage of a new limited partnership 
act allowed limited partners to fully participate in the control aspect 
of the partnership without having personal liability.76  The Georgia 
statute forced the IRS to decide whether a limited partnership with 
managing limited partners could be a tax partnership.77  An affirm­
ative answer would force the IRS to decide whether an LLC, which 
has no general partners, also could be a tax partnership.  If the IRS 
refused to accommodate the Georgia limited partnership, it would 
have had to define the level of control and liability the general part­
ners needed to have for the firm to be taxed as a partnership.  Al­
though the IRS delayed a ruling on the tax status of the Georgia 
statute,78 the day of reckoning with these issues was approaching. 
A third key event in the evolution of the LLC was when Con­
gress decided to characterize publicly traded partnerships as corpo­
rations.79  Congress sought with this provision to head off mass 
disincorporations of corporations into limited partnerships intended 
to take advantage of the reduction of personal income tax rates. 
The law also lifted the burden of preventing this result from the tax 
classification rules. 
These events set the stage for a 1988 Internal Revenue Service 
ruling classifying a limited liability company—that is, a non-corpo­
rate firm all of whose members had limited liability—as a tax part­
nership.80  Within six years all but three states had adopted LLC 
statutes.81  The states continued tinkering with the provisions to 
press against the limits of the tax classification rules.  By the end of 
72. Id. at 86. 
73. The following discussion of the three events is drawn from Ribstein, supra 
note 2, at 120-22. 
74. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). 
75. See Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions After Thirty Years, 
2 J. ECON. PERSP. 99, 117-18 (1988). 
76. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-9A-2 (2003). 
77. Ribstein, supra note 2, at 121. R 
78. See Rev. Rul. 91-51, 1991-2 C.B. 434. 
79. See I.R.C. § 7704(a) (2008). 
80. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. 
81. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 37, § 1:2. R 
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the 1990s, all states had adopted LLC statutes.82  The IRS gave up 
trying to distinguish between tax partnerships and tax corporations 
and adopted the “check-the-box” rule which allowed non-publicly 
traded firms to decide whether they wanted to be taxed as partner­
ships or corporations.83  Governance structure was now separated 
from tax structure.  LLCs could adopt corporate-type governance 
and still be subject to the partnership tax, or they could remain 
partnership-type firms under state law while electing to be taxed as 
corporations under Subchapter S or Subchapter C of the Internal 
Revenue Code.84 
LLC statutes have continued to evolve after adoption of check-
the-box.  States are evidently competing in a race to keep local 
firms from fleeing to Delaware’s sophisticated lawyers and courts.85 
Since firms now could adopt corporate-type terms without fear of 
subjecting themselves to the corporate double tax, the LLC could 
finally evolve into the flexible mix of corporate and partnership fea­
tures small firms had always wanted instead of having to choose 
between the intimate general partnership and the unwieldy corpo­
ration.86  Among other things, LLC statutes included default provi­
sions for centralized management and for pro rata sharing of 
management and financial rights, in contrast to the equal rights in 
partnership law.  States also amended their LLC statutes to provide 
that, unlike partnerships, LLCs no longer dissolved because of the 
exit of a single member.  These moves facilitated the creation of 
corporate-type entities that delegated power to managers and to 
controlling shareholders. 
The evidence concerning state competition for LLCs87 suggests 
that this competition revolves around three general formats.  Dela­
ware dominates the market for larger LLCs, perhaps because these 
firms value Delaware’s flexible statute and sophisticated planning. 
Many states compete to encourage local firms not to form in Dela­
ware by giving them Delaware-type flexibility. The remaining 
states that are not actively innovating and offering mainly uniform 
rules may be trying to offer local small firms enough default rules 
82. Id. 
83. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1-3 (2004). 
84. Perhaps surprisingly, many LLCs have chosen the latter course. See Chris-
man, supra note 3, at 480-83. R 
85. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Juris­
dictional Competition for LLCs, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91. 
86. See Ribstein, supra note 2, at 137-92 (discussing features of modern LLCs). R 
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and judicial protection so that their members do not have to engage 
in costly planning or worry about being victimized by improvident 
agreements. 
IV. MATURITY 
The full statutory recognition of LLCs gave closely held firms a 
robust contracting platform and thereby enabled them to avoid the 
uncertainty created by close corporation cases like Wilkes. Closely 
held firms now can choose statutes that accommodate their con­
tracting needs without having to compromise these objectives to get 
limited liability and favorable tax treatment. This enabled courts to 
focus on full-fledged enforcement of the parties’ contracts rather 
than on general statutory oppression standards. This Part shows 
how courts have responded by analyzing recent LLC judicial disso­
lution cases. 
A. Judicial Dissolution in LLCs and Close Corporations 
Judicial remedies continue to be necessary in LLCs as in close 
corporations because, as in all firms, managers, and controlling 
owners may exercise power that can be abused, and because LLC 
statutes either do not provide for any default exit right or deny a 
leaving partner the right to a buyout of her interest.  A dissociated 
LLC member often is left, sometimes unexpectedly, with a non-
managing equity interest.88  LLC statutes eliminated partnership-
type default exit-at-will after “check-the-box” enabled LLCs to 
have corporate-type continuity of life without having to worry 
about being taxed like corporations.  Family firms’ incentive to re­
duce estate and gift taxes also spurred the new provisions. The tax 
code provides that valuation of partnership interests can take ac­
count of statutory restrictions on liquidation rights but not those 
imposed merely by agreement.89 Even without this tax incentive, 
many LLCs would want to restrict exit to protect against draining 
cash for buyouts or to reduce the risk of member opportunism of 
the sort discussed above in connection with Page v. Page.90 
88. In some cases such provisions have caused particular and unexpected hard­
ship. See Holdeman v. Epperson, 857 N.E.2d 583 (Ohio 2006) (involving estate of de­
ceased member); Lieberman v. Mossbrook, 208 P.3d 1296 (Wyo. 2009) (protracted 
litigation concerning rights of a dissociated member frozen into an economic-only 
interest). 
89. See I.R.C. § 2704 (2008). 
90. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. R 
547 
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Without a cash-out right, LLC members need a default judicial 
exit route to protect them from oppression by controlling holders.91 
Most LLC statutes, including Delaware92 and New York,93 author­
ize judicial dissolution only “when[ ] it is not reasonably practicable 
to carry on the business in conformity with the” parties’ agreement, 
with a minority of states adding close corporation-type oppression 
grounds.94 
Even without these statutory provisions, courts likely would 
apply flexible remedies that do not relegate the parties to the literal 
contractual language.  This conclusion does not rest on behavioral 
psychology, norms, or other reasons for hesitating to enforce con­
tracts.95  Rather, it simply recognizes the costs and infeasibility of 
contracting for every contingency in long term contracts.96  As dis­
cussed below,97 this approach to interpretation is consistent with 
standard contractual rules such as the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing.  It assumes that rational contracting parties 
recognize the limits of their foresight—that is, have “bounded 
rationality.”98 
B. Analysis of LLC Judicial Dissolution Cases 
Closely held firms’ evolution from close corporations to LLCs 
means courts can now take more seriously express contracts and 
statutory default rules.  I do not suggest, as Robert Thompson as­
91. See Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & The Limited Liability Company: 
Learning (Or Not) From Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 968 
(2005). 
92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802 (2005). 
93. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 702 (McKinney 2010). 
94. Id.; see Jens Dammann & Matthias Sch ̈undeln, Where are Limited Liability 
Companies Formed? An Empirical Analysis app. III, tbl. 10a-d (Revised June 28, 2010) 
(Univ. of Tex. School of Law, Law and Economics Research, Paper No. 126, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633472 (tabulating LLC statutory dissolution 
remedies); Thompson, supra note 49. 
95. See Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression 
Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161 (2010) (analyzing these considerations in relation to 
close corporation oppression remedies but concluding that the remedies are justified on 
contractual grounds). 
96. Id. at 1166. 
97. See infra Part IV.D.2. 
98. See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, in MODELS 
OF MAN, SOCIAL AND RATIONAL: MATHEMATICAL ESSAYS ON RATIONAL HUMAN BE­
HAVIOR IN A SOCIAL SETTING 99 (1957); Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Ration­
ality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AMER. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003); Oliver 
E. Williamson, The Economies Of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 
AM. J. SOC. 548, 553-54 (1981). 
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serts,99 that LLC statutes eliminate the need for judicial gap-filling. 
No statute or agreement can cover all the contingencies involved in 
a complex and open-ended contract like a business association.  My 
point instead is that, by providing a clearly non-corporate structure 
of default rules and a variety of state statutes, LLCs make it easier 
than close corporations for parties to reach agreements that ap­
proximate their ex ante expectations.  Courts can then fill in the 
gaps using the contract and statute as general guidelines rather than 
having to construct a contract from a whole cloth as in Wilkes. 
Judicial opinions in close corporations tend to proceed from a 
generalized notion of what the minority shareholder expected from 
the deal—that is, the ability to get distributions or salary, without 
regard to the express and implied contract terms.  By contrast, 
courts in LLC cases increasingly have focused on what parties actu­
ally put in their contracts, interpreted in light of the statutory stan­
dard form they used as a basis for their business agreement. 
Instead of asking what reasonable parties would want if they could 
contract cheaply, courts now tend to ask what the specific parties 
actually wanted given what they contracted for. 
LLC cases reflect this subtle but important difference from 
close corporation law even under LLC statutory provisions that re­
semble traditional close corporation language. For example, 
Decker v. Decker dissolved a firm for a member’s misbehavior in 
deliberately sabotaging an “I cut you choose” buy-sell agree­
ment.100  Although the court applied close-corporation-type op­
pression language in the Wisconsin LLC statute,101 its holding was 
consistent with a standard contractual good faith analysis of block­
ing behavior intended to thwart the expected operation of a con­
tractual provision.  Also, Roemmich v. Eagle Eye Development, 
LLC, applying the “unfairly prejudicial” basis of judicial dissolu­
tionin the North Dakota statute,102 denied plaintiff a forced buyout 
on the ground that the plaintiff could reasonably expect only more 
information and an opportunity to participate in decision-making 
rather than continued employment in the firm.103  And Horning v. 
Horning Construction, LLC denied a locked-in member’s request 
for judicial dissolution because the statute had no default exit right, 
99. Thompson, supra note 49. 
100. Decker v. Decker, 726 N.W.2d 664, 670 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). 
101. Id. at 669; see also WIS. STAT. § 183.0902 (2002). 
102. Roemmich v. Eagle Eye Dev., LLC, No. 1:04-cv-079, 2006 WL 2433410, at 
*31 (D.N.D. Aug. 16, 2006). 
103. Id. at *40 
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noting that the legislature had deliberately restricted exit in the 
statute.104 
The Delaware/New York-type judicial dissolution standard105 
gives courts more reason to focus on the parties’ contracts by re­
quiring the courts to consider whether the parties can carry on the 
firm “in conformity with” the parties’ agreement.  Recent Delaware 
and New York cases illustrate the enhanced role of the agreement 
under this provision.  In Fisk Ventures, LLC. v. Segal, an investor 
used its veto power under the operating agreement to refuse to per­
mit additional funding of a biotech firm that would have diluted its 
interest.106  Delaware Chancellor Chandler held that the resulting 
deadlock made it “not reasonably practicable to carry on the busi­
ness in conformity with a limited liability company agreement” 
under the Delaware LLC Act.107  The court’s attention to the con­
tract language is evident from its refusal to force the investor to 
resort to his put right to avoid the deadlock.108  The court noted 
that the investor had a contractual right not to exercise the put right 
and reasoned: 
If . . . deadlock cannot be remedied through a legal mechanism 
set forth within the four corners of the operating agreement, dis­
solution becomes the only remedy available as a matter of law. 
The Court is in no position to redraft the LLC Agreement for 
these sophisticated and well-represented parties.109 
Lola Cars International, Ltd. v. Krohn Racing, LLC, applied 
the Fisk standard in similarly denying a motion to dismiss a dissolu­
tion action under the same Delaware provision.110  The court again 
held that the plaintiff did not have to exercise voluntary buyout and 
104. Horning v. Horning Constr., LLC, 816 N.Y.S.2d 877, 818-83 (Sup. 2006). 
105. See supra text accompanying notes 92-104; infra text accompanying notes R 
106-137. R 
106. Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2009 WL 73957, *1-2 (Del. Ch. 
2009). See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Reconciling Oppression with an LLC Agree­
ment, IDEOBLOG (Jan. 27, 2009), http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2009/01/recon­
ciling-oppression-with-an-llc-agreement.html (discussing Fisk Ventures case). 
107. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802 (West 2011). 
108. Fisk Ventures, LLC, 2009 WL 73957, at *5. 
109. Id. at *6. 
110. Lola Cars Int’l, Ltd. v. Krohn Racing, LLC, No. C.A. Nos. 44-79-VCN, 4886­
VCN, 2009 WL 4052681, at *6-7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2009); for further discussion, see 
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termination rights to avoid dissolution.111  The court interpreted the 
contractual termination provision as not displacing the statutory 
dissolution remedy, reasoning that 
the Operating Agreement nowhere requires that a member ter­
minate the Operating Agreement solely in accord with its stipu­
lated termination provisions.  Thus, the Court cannot conclude 
that these terms are exclusive.  It simply cannot be true that a 
number of nonexclusive, permissive termination clauses in the 
Operating Agreement can preclude judicial dissolution as pro­
vided for in the Act.112 
The court ultimately denied dissolution after trial, again relying 
on the operating agreement: 
The Court concludes by emphasizing that a party to a limited 
liability company agreement may not seek judicial dissolution 
simply as a means of freeing Lola itself from what it considers a 
bad deal.  This is so even if the Member Parties’ relationship 
has—as here, due largely to pressure applied by Lola both within 
and without the litigation context—been badly damaged.  En­
dorsing such a rule would allow for one party—unfairly—to de­
feat the reasonable expectations of its counterparty.  Moreover, 
the Member Parties in their private ordering effort embraced a 
provision within the Operating Agreement that allows for disen­
tanglement. . . .  [I]t is not for the Court to terminate, or rewrite, 
the Operating Agreement.113 
In Vila v. BVWebTies LLC, Vice Chancellor Strine ordered 
the dissolution of an LLC owned in equal shares by television per­
sonality Bob Vila and businessman George Hill.114  Although the 
operating agreement required both owners’ consent to all business 
decisions,115 the owners had fundamental disagreements about the 
111. Lola Cars Int’l, Ltd., 2009 WL 4052681, at *6 (“The Operating Agreement 
provides a buy-out mechanism in the event of a member dispute; this self-help disentan­
glement provision, however, is entirely voluntary.”). 
112. Id. (footnote omitted). 
113. Lola Cars Int’l, Ltd. v. Krohn Racing, LLC, No. C.A. Nos. 44-79-VCN, 4886­
VCN, 2010 WL 3314484, at *24 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2, 2010) (footnotes omitted). The court 
explained its apparent change of heart from the denial of the motion to dismiss by 
noting that the level of managerial misconduct proved at trial fell short of the com­
plaint’s allegations, which bore on the practicability of continuing the LLC. Id. at *24 
n.275.  However, it is not clear how this misconduct mattered under the court’s earlier 
expectations-based analysis. 
114. Vila v. BVWebTies LLC, No. C.A. No. 4308-VCS, 2010 WL 3866098, at *19 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2010). 
115. Id. at *2. 
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direction of the business,116 and Vila had terminated the license for 
his intellectual property that the firm needed to operate.117  The 
court ordered dissolution despite the company’s continued earn­
ings.118  As in the above cases, the court applied the parties’ agree­
ment rather than ad hoc equitable principles.119  V.C. Strine 
reasoned that 
[w]hat Hill wishes to do is to pursue a business having nothing to 
do with the basic purpose for which WebTies was formed and to 
do so over the objection of one of its two managers.  Of course, 
the existence of a deadlock would not necessarily justify a disso­
lution if the LLC Agreement provided a means to resolve it equi­
tably.  But the LLC Agreement does not contain a buy-sell 
arrangement or any other provision (such as one providing for 
the appointment of an agreed-upon third manager) to resolve the 
deadlock.  Rather, the LLC Agreement contemplates that a 
member or manager may seek judicial dissolution. This is what 
Vila has done, and he has succeeded in proving that dissolution is 
warranted.120 
A New York court attended to the operating agreement in re­
jecting dissolution in In re 1545 Ocean Avenue, LLC.121  The com­
plaint alleged that the parties were deadlocked.122  The court was 
careful to distinguish the statutory standard for dissolving an LLC, 
which did not explicitly include deadlock, from that for dissolving a 
close corporation, which did.123  The court reasoned that 
since the Legislature, in determining the criteria for dissolution 
of various business entities in New York, did not cross-reference 
such grounds from one type of entity to another, it would be in­
appropriate for this Court to import dissolution grounds from the 
Business Corporation Law or partnership Law to the LLCL. 
Despite the standard for dissolution enunciated in LLCL 
702, there is no definition of “not reasonably practicable” in the 
context of the dissolution of a limited liability company. . . . 
Such standard, however, is not to be confused with the stan­
dard for the judicial dissolution of corporations . . . or 
partnerships. . . . 
116. Id. at *5. 
117. Id. at *6. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at *7-14. 
120. Id. at *8 (footnotes omitted). 
121. In re 1545 Ocean Avenue, LLC, 893 N.Y.S.2d 590 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). 
122. Id. at 593. 
123. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1104 (McKinney 2003). 
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Limited liability companies . . . fall within the ambit of 
neither the Business Corporation Law nor the Partnership 
Law.124 
The court held that the statute’s reference to carrying on “in 
conformity with the operating agreement” requires “initially a con-
tract-based analysis.”125  The court refused to dissolve based solely 
on the LLC’s failure to hold meetings not required by the agree­
ment, or on member disagreement where the agreement provided 
for action unilaterally by the manager.126  The court left open the 
possibility of dissolving if the LLC is still operating, but only if it 
could not realize the firm’s purpose stated in the operating agree­
ment.127  Post 1545 Ocean cases in New York have been guided by 
what one commentator characterized as its “contract-based 
analysis.”128 
It follows from the distinct contract-based nature of the judicial 
dissolution remedy in LLCs that courts would refuse to characterize 
LLCs as simply another kind of “incorporated partnership.” Thus, 
the court in 1545 Ocean reasoned: 
The LLCL . . . clarifies its scope by defining ‘limited liability com­
pany’ as ‘an unincorporated organization of one or more persons 
having limited liability . . . other than a partnership or trust.’ 
Thus, the existence and character of these various entities are 
statutorily dissimilar as are the laws relating to their 
dissolution.129 
124. In re 1545 Ocean Avenue, LLC, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 594-95 (citation omitted). 
125. Id. at 596. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 597. 
128. Peter H. Mahler, “The Emerging Influence of 1545 Ocean Avenue on Judicial 
Dissolution of LLCs,” N.Y. BUS. DIVORCE (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.nybusiness 
divorce.com/2011/02/articles/llcs/the-emerging-influence-of-1545-ocean-avenue-on­
judicial-dissolution-of-llcs/index.html.  Mahler discusses three New York cases: 
Mehraban v. McIntosh, Index No. 001683/09 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. Jan. 19, 2011) 
(granting dissolution based on financial infeasibility of achieving LLC’s business objec­
tive); Matter of Singh (Data Palette Information Services, LLC), Index No. 4797/10 
(Sup Ct. Queens Cnty. Jan. 7, 2011) (refusing to dissolve because of lack of showing 
that LLC cannot achieve its business purpose); Matter of RBR Equities, LLC, Index 
No. 40736/10 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. Jan. 18, 2011) (refusing to dissolve in light of evi­
dence supporting feasibility of LLC’s achieving its business purpose). 
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Similarly, a federal court refused to allow an LLC member to bring 
a shareholder oppression action under the New Jersey Business 
Corporation Act.130 
Although the contract-based approach arguably represents a 
technological improvement over vague close corporation remedies, 
it is not clear that all courts will sign onto this approach.131 Thus, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court characterized an LLC as 
a “closely held corporate entity” and applied the Donahue-Wilkes 
analysis.132 Massachusetts has heavily invested in developing this 
line of cases and evidently is reluctant to discard it. This could be 
viewed as an illustration of the desirable jurisdictional choice LLC 
statutes offer.  Whatever the apparent attractions of the contract-
based approach, it is not clearly superior for all firms, including 
those that seek to take advantage of a substantial body of local law 
based on the corporate approach. 
C. Limits of Contract: Opting Out of Judicial Dissolution 
As discussed above, a statutory judicial dissolution remedy can 
be an important aid to contracting given the parties’ inability to 
fully specify the terms of a long-term open-ended contract such as 
an LLC operating agreement.  But should the parties be able to 
dispense with the cost and uncertainty of a court proceeding, even 
where a contract-based dissolution standard minimizes judicial in­
terference with the agreement? 
The Delaware Chancery Court answered this question by en­
forcing an explicit contractual waiver of the judicial dissolution 
remedy.  The relevant operating agreement in R & R Capital, LLC 
v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, provided: 
130. See Casella v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. 09-0421 (JAP), 2010 WL 
3001919, at *4 (D.N.J., July 28, 2010); cf. CML V, LLC v. Bax, 6 A.3d 238, 250 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (holding that a creditor lacks standing under the Delaware LLC act to sue an 
insolvent LLC derivatively because the Delaware LLC Act explicitly prohibits such 
suits). 
131. Indeed, there was confusion even in some early Delaware LLC cases. Haley 
v. Talcott ordered dissolution in two-member LLCs based on a Delaware corporate 
provision permitting dissolution in this situation, and despite the existence of a contrac­
tual buyout right.  Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86, 96-97 (Del. Ch. 2004). In re Silver 
Leaf, LLC ordered dissolution where the members were deadlocked under the operat­
ing agreement, distinguishing Haley only because the firm had three members and 
therefore was not eligible for relief. In re Silver Leaf, LLC, No. Civ. A. 20611, 2005 WL 
2045641, at *10, n.86 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2005). 
132. Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Mass. 2009); Mark J. Loewen­
stein, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.: An Historical Perspective, 33 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 339 (2011). 
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Waiver of Dissolution Rights.  The Members agree that irrepara­
ble damage would occur if any member should bring an action 
for judicial dissolution of the Company.  Accordingly each mem­
ber accepts the provisions under this Agreement as such Mem­
ber’s sole entitlement on Dissolution of the Company and waives 
and renounces such Member’s right to seek a court decree of dis­
solution or to seek the appointment by a court of a liquidator for 
the Company.133 
The court held that this effectively barred an action for judicial 
dissolution by a member, although another clause of the agreement 
permitted dissolution upon court decree in an action for a member 
(that is, by the personal representative or assignee).134  This was the 
first case to enforce an agreement that contemplated neither judi­
cial dissolution nor arbitration.135  The court reasoned that 
[t]he allure of the limited liability company . . . would be eviscer­
ated if the parties could simply petition this court to renegotiate 
their agreements when relationships sour.  Here, the sophisti­
cated members of the seven Waiver Entities knowingly, volunta­
rily, and unambiguously waived their rights to petition this Court 
for dissolution or the appointment of a receiver under the LLC 
Act.  This waiver is permissible and enforceable because it con­
travenes neither the Act itself nor the public policy of the 
state.136 
[T]here are legitimate business reasons why members of a limited 
liability company may wish to waive their right to seek dissolu­
tion or the appointment of a receiver. For example, it is common 
for lenders to deem in loan agreements with limited liability com­
panies that the filing of a petition for judicial dissolution will con­
stitute a noncurable event of default.  In such instances, it is 
necessary for all members to prospectively agree to waive their 
rights to judicial dissolution to protect the limited liability com­
133. R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC, 
2008 WL 3846318, *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008).  For further discussion, see Larry E. 
Ribstein, Waiving Judicial Dissolution: Our Remedies Oft In Ourselves Do Lie, IDE­
OBLOG  (Aug. 23, 2008), http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2008/08/waiving-judicia. 
html (last visited Jan. 29, 2011). 
134. R & R Capital, LLC, 2008 WL 3846318, at *8. 
135. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 37, § 11:5, at 96 n.31 (discussing cases 
holding the parties could substitute arbitration for dissolution). R & R Capital, LLC 
leaves open what types of contractual provisions constitute waivers of the judicial disso­
lution remedy.  For example, Lola, discussed supra notes 110-113, held that an agree- R 
ment that provided for various causes of termination by the parties did not explicitly 
exclude the possibility of judicial dissolution. 
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pany.  Otherwise, a disgruntled member could push the limited 
liability company into default on all of its outstanding loans sim­
ply by filing a petition with this Court.137 
D. Specific Duties to Members 
Even without a statutory judicial dissolution remedy, courts 
could give relief to oppressed minority holders for breach of a fidu­
ciary or other duty to individual members. This theory might justify 
remedies like those in Wilkes and Donahue.138  However, impor­
tant questions concern the nature and existence of the relevant du­
ties.139  Moreover, if no such duties exist, it is questionable whether 
courts should, in effect, bring them in through the back door of the 
oppression remedy. 
1. Fiduciary Duties 
Individual members may be owed fiduciary duties.  However, 
the fiduciary approach has limited reach. Fiduciary duties are ap­
propriate only where owners delegate open-ended power over their 
investments to agents.140  In this situation a duty to refrain from 
self-interested conduct is justified as the best way to ensure effec­
tive judicial supervision of the agent’s conduct.  But owners exer­
cise their voting power in the firm on their own behalf to protect 
their interests against co-owners’ and managers’ selfish conduct. 
Burdening owners with a duty to refrain from self-interested con­
duct could undermine the self-protective function of owners’ voting 
rights.  Accordingly, controlling owners, acting solely as such, 
should not be deemed to have a default fiduciary duty of disinter­
ested conduct either to the firm or to individual owners.  Owners’ 
conduct should be subject only to the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing which, as discussed below, depends on the 
rights and duties provided for in the parties’ agreement. 
It is not clear whether the remedies in cases like Donahue and 
Wilkes can be justified on the basis of a breach of duty by the cor­
poration’s managers to minority shareholders.  Some states provide 
137. Id. at *7-8. 
138. See Moll, supra note 91, at 910 n.96. 
139. For a review of various duties courts have devised to assist minority share­
holders in close corporations, and the gaps in these duties, see Judd F. Sneirson, Soft 
Paternalism for Close Corporations: Helping Shareholders Help Themselves, 2008 WIS. 
L. REV. 899, 904-914. 
140. See Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 
215. 
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for duties to individual close corporation shareholders.141  Some 
also clarify the existence of duties to individual LLC members.142 
Massachusetts has extended its Donahue-Wilkes analysis to this 
context.143 
There are, however, strong arguments against creating such du­
ties.  First, since the fiduciary duty inherently is one to refrain from 
self-interested conduct, a non-self-interested manager should not be 
liable to anyone for breach of fiduciary duty even if she favored 
some members over others.  Courts often could face difficulties try­
ing to decide which of several constituencies a non-conflicted mem­
ber should have favored. For example, In re Allentown 
Ambassadors, Inc. permitted a claim against a manager of a base­
ball league organized as a North Carolina LLC for breaching a fidu­
ciary duty to a member in part by not giving it the same 
opportunities as other teams to go dark.144  It may not be clear in 
such a case whether the manager should have sacrificed the league’s 
interest for that of a particular member by cancelling some of the 
games. 
Second, any duty of managers of a closely held firm to minority 
owners would indirectly be one by the controlling owners, as in 
Donahue and Wilkes.  Even if courts insist that the manager has a 
duty to act on behalf of all the owners, the manager still will obey 
those who can fire him.  Moreover, as discussed above, the fiduciary 
duty is one to refrain from acting self-interestedly, rather than to 
act in a particular way or for a particular constituency.  Even a man­
ager acting for controlling owners might breach her duty by self-
dealing, but the duty and remedy for breach are owed to the firm or 
all of its members rather than only to the minority owners as in 
Donahue and Wilkes. 
141. See Douglas K. Moll, Of Donahue and Fiduciary Duty:  Much Ado About 
. . . ?, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 471 (2011) (discussing employment and management 
duties between shareholders); Sneirson, supra note 139, at 906-11. 
142. Sneirson, supra note 139, at 964-65.  As for recognition of duties to individ­
ual members under LLC law, see Laugh Factory, Inc. v. Basciano, 608 F. Supp. 2d 549, 
565 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (New York law); In re Allentown Ambassadors, Inc., 361 B.R. 422, 
461 (Bnkr. E.D. Pa. 2007) (although the applicable North Carolina LLC statute and 
operating agreement provided for a duty only to the LLC, the court applied the duty 
under North Carolina’s close corporation law); REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT 
(RULLCA) § 409(a), (g) (2006) (providing that members and managers of LLC owe 
fiduciary duties to the company and to the other members). 
143. See supra text accompanying note 132. 
144. In re Allentown Ambassadors, Inc., 361 B.R. at 429-30. 
557 
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Even if a manager has breached a fiduciary duty to the firm, 
the appropriate remedy in a closely held firm might be a suit by 
individual owners rather than entrusting prosecution of the claim to 
the allegedly wrongdoing managers.  The derivative remedy is de­
signed for publicly held firms where the owners cannot easily coor­
dinate to manage the claim.145  All injured owners of a closely held 
firm might be able to join a direct suit.146  Even if the shareholders 
sue individually, the claim would still effectively be a joint claim on 
behalf of the firm rather than one on behalf of a particular group of 
(minority) shareholders.147 
Apart from who can sue, the dissolution remedy differs from 
the classic damage remedy in a fiduciary duty case.  Dissolution ad­
dresses the absence of an external market for the owner’s shares by 
providing an internal market.  The intimate nature of these firms 
supports a default rule that bundles litigation with breakup rather 
than saddling a going concern with acrimonious litigation.148 How­
ever, judicial dissolution for misconduct can give a weapon to an 
opportunistic minority shareholder.  A less drastic damage remedy 
accordingly may be more cost-effective.  Bundling litigation with 
dissolution is more appropriate for the intimate default general 
partnership than for the more general-purpose LLC.  Consistent 
with these principles, the court in 1545 Ocean said that an LLC 
cannot be dissolved merely because of managerial self-dealing 
under the statutory contract-oriented standard discussed above un­
less the conduct was “contrary to the contemplated functioning and 
purpose of the limited liability company.”149  The court held that 
dissolution was unnecessary where the LLC’s main business (a ren­
ovation project) was close to completion and could be handled 
under the existing management structure.150 
Where dissolution is too drastic but damages do not provide 
adequate relief the court may be tempted to order a buyout, as in 
Donahue, or an equitable damages remedy such as the wages or­
dered in Wilkes. Courts fashioning such remedies may have to con­
145. Larry E. Ribstein, Litigating in LLCs, 64 BUS. LAW. 739, 753-55 (2009) 
[hereinafter Litigating in LLCs]. 
146. See id. 
147. Id. 
148. See Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Exclusivity of Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 
221-27 (1995). 
149. In re 1545 Ocean Ave., LLC, 72 A.3d 121, 132 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). 
150. Id. at 129-32. 
 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE210.txt unknown Seq: 28 27-SEP-11 10:19 
558 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:531 
tend with the absence of statutory authorization.151  This result 
might be defended on the ground that a dissolution order often re­
sults in a buyout in any case.  Ordering a buyout may give the plain­
tiff less leverage to insist on a higher price depending on how the 
court structures the buyout.  On the other hand, assuming LLC 
statutes are designed to give greater weight to the parties’ agree­
ments than close corporation statutes, courts in LLC cases should 
hesitate to alter statutory remedies that the parties may have relied 
on. 
2. Good Faith 
Although fiduciary duties arguably are inappropriate in litiga­
tion between controlling and minority owners, the minority may be 
entitled to a remedy under the implied contractual covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.  Courts applying this doctrine provide a 
remedy that is consistent with the parties’ expectations inferred 
under the express terms of the agreement.152 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing would not 
justify relief in some prominent close corporation cases. The basic 
problem in these cases, as discussed throughout this Article, is that 
the parties’ attempt to combine partnership substance and corpo­
rate form renders their contract incoherent. Although the courts 
might purport to rely on the parties’ expectations, as discussed 
above these are generalized expectations of fair treatment, not 
those based on the specific deal.  Close corporation oppression 
gives the parties an exit right they did not bargain for and without 
any clear breach of duty. 
Wilkes, Donahue, and Kemp & Beatley illustrate the problems 
of applying the implied good faith covenant in close corporations in 
the absence of any contractual basis for relief. There was no ex­
press contract at all in Donahue on which to hang the put right the 
court gave to the minority shareholder. Wilkes ignored an explicit 
corporate arrangement that empowered the directors to fix officer 
pay and the shareholders to elect directors. Dissolution in Kemp & 
Beatley could not be based on an implied contractual covenant 
analysis because the parties had no contract that could reasonably 
be interpreted as giving non-employees a right to distributions. 
151. See, e.g., In re Superior Vending, LLC, 71 A.3d 1153, 1154 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2010). 
152. See Oregon RSA No. 6, Inc. v. Castle Rock Cellular of Oregon Ltd. P’ship, 
840 F. Supp. 770, 775-77 (D. Or. 1993), aff’d, 76 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1996) (illustrating 
this approach to the implied covenant). 
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Plaintiffs’ claims in the recent Delaware and New York LLC 
dissolution cases discussed above153 could rest more comfortably on 
the implied good faith covenant. The “not reasonably practicable” 
statutory standard154 assumes that the parties would not want to be 
forced to continue in a contractual relationship whose agreed pur­
pose had no reasonable chance of fulfillment.  Moreover, the courts 
apply the standard with reference to the contract the parties actu­
ally made rather than their generalized expectations or the contract 
they wish they could have made under better legal conditions.155  In 
Fisk, Lola, 1545 Ocean, and Vila the parties were at an impasse and 
the contract provided for no way out.156  In 1545 Ocean, the court 
refused to let the parties out of a deal that was still viable despite 
the sort of manager misconduct that might have justified judicial 
dissolution of a close corporation.157  Although the plaintiffs in 
these cases wanted to escape their deals, the courts made exit con­
tingent on the deals they had made.  In Vila, the court held that 
Vila’s conduct, which plaintiff sought to make the subject of a 
breach of fiduciary duty action, was covered by the contract and 
therefore should be treated in a breach of contract action.158 
It is important to distinguish the good faith covenant from a 
cause of action based on fiduciary breach or controlling shareholder 
opportunism.  The reference to “good faith” is misleading, since the 
remedy is based on the contract’s having a gap rather than on mor­
ally blameworthy conduct.  If the defendant breached a fiduciary 
duty, a separate action for breach is appropriate unless the firm is 
small enough to require bundling the remedy for breach with exit 
or dissolution. If the defendant has not breached a fiduciary duty, 
then the court should provide a remedy only if this would be consis­
tent with the parties’ agreement whether or not the defendant’s 
conduct could be considered unfair or grasping for some reason. 
V. THE FUTURE OF CLOSELY HELD FIRMS 
This Article has shown that LLCs represent a significant step 
in the evolution of closely held firms. This step was enabled by tax 
153. See supra notes 105-124 and accompanying text. R 
154. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
155. See supra Part IV.B. 
156. See supra Part IV.B. 
157. In re 1545 Ocean Avenue, LLC v. Crown Royal Ventures, LLC, 893 
N.Y.S.2d 590, 596 (App. Ct. 2010). 
158. Vila v. BVWebTies LLC, No. C.A. No. 4308-VCS, 2010 WL 3866098, at *8 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2010). 
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changes, which in turn spurred state legislatures and lawyers to 
craft statutory standard forms and agreements that better fit the 
parties’ expectations than was feasible with the close corporation. 
These changes, in turn, transformed judicial dissolution into an ex­
tension of the parties’ contract similar to the contractual implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, in contrast to the analogous 
close corporation remedy which called for courts to make up con­
tracts out of parties’ general expectations. The closely held firm is 
still evolving.  This Part identifies some specific challenges and op­
portunities raised by this Article’s analysis. 
A. Judicial Dissolution Standards 
We have seen that courts and legislatures are just beginning to 
recognize and apply the contractual analysis in LLC cases. 
Lawmakers still need to more fully recognize the fundamental dif­
ferences between LLCs and close corporations regarding the im­
portance and feasibility of contracting. 
This fuller recognition should begin with the wider adoption of 
statutory language that tracks the contract based on the Delaware-
New York model.  Legislatures should reject close-corporation-type 
language such as that found in the Revised Uniform Limited Liabil­
ity Company Act § 701(a)(5), which provides for judicial dissolu­
tion based on “illegal,” “fraudulent,” or “oppressive” acts without a 
clear reference to the agreement.159  Direct damage actions ade­
quately address such party misconduct. In contrast, allowing mem­
bers to exit via buyout or dissolution involves complex balancing of 
costs and benefits that the parties need to address in their agree­
ments.  The legislature therefore should invite the courts to bring 
those contracts to bear to the extent possible rather than focusing 
on the isolated element of party misconduct.  Party misconduct may 
be insufficient to justify dissolution, as in 1545 Ocean, or unneces­
sary given the parties’ deadlock, as in Lola and Fisk.160  The con­
tractual approach also requires legislators to clarify whether the 
parties should be able to waive judicial dissolution, as the Delaware 
chancery court held in R & R.161 
159. RULLCA § 701(a)(4), like several other LLC statutes, combines this lan­
guage with “not reasonably practicable” grounds. See supra note 94 and accompanying 
text (summarizing LLC statutory provisions).  The presence of this contractual standard 
in the section reinforces the notion that the subsection (5) ground does not depend on 
the contract. 
160. See supra subpart IV.B. (discussing these cases). 
161. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. R 
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Even if the statutes clearly provide that the contract controls, 
the courts must decide whether and to what extent the parties have 
waived or limited the statute in particular agreements. Fisk and 
Lola, for example, refused to force the parties to use voluntary 
buyout provisions as an alternative to seeking judicial dissolu­
tion.162  This suggests that the parties can avoid judicial dissolution 
only by either explicitly waiving it as in R & R or by providing that 
contractual buyout or termination is the exclusive way to end the 
relationship.  The courts might relax the standard and, for example, 
hold that the parties have implicitly opted out of dissolution if they 
provided for extensive conflict resolution procedures even if they 
have not explicitly made these procedures exclusive. 
An additional question concerns the future of the oppression 
remedy in close corporations.  The parties’ ability to choose the 
LLC form arguably reduces the need for an oppression remedy in 
close corporations.  This Article has shown that the LLC con­
tracting technology significantly reduced the need for broad judicial 
relief that effectively rewrites the parties’ contract.  However, this 
does not necessarily mean that contracting parties should be pun­
ished for not choosing the correct contract or standard form, since 
that would involve a possibly unwarranted assumption about the 
feasibility of careful planning in closely held firms.163  The close cor­
poration form might be preserved as part of the menu of con­
tracting choices for unsophisticated parties who need special 
judicial help.  The long run need for this option will depend on the 
continued evolution of LLC statutes and case law. 
B. Improving Contracting Technology 
This Article has characterized judicial dissolution as a contrac­
tual mechanism for responding to unforeseeable changes where 
owners cannot cheaply exit via sale of their shares.  Because LLCs 
provided an alternative to the close corporation, courts’ role in judi­
cial dissolution cases can shrink.  LLCs have not, however, ad­
dressed all contracting problems in closely held firms. The parties 
to closely held firms, as with all long-term contracts, always will 
162. See supra notes 106-113 and accompanying text. R 
163. Although it is questionable that altering or restricting contracts appropri­
ately addresses any such contracting problems, these issues are beyond the scope of this 
Article. See Means, supra note 95, at 1199 (arguing that parties’ ability to choose the 
LLC form should not restrict the availability of the oppression remedy). 
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need some judicial help dealing with contracting gaps. The LLC is 
only one of many likely future developments that could affect judi­
cial remedies.  The following subsections discuss other develop­
ments that might affect the need for and nature of judicial 
assistance in closely held firms. 
1. More Statutes 
One mechanism for additionally improving contracting in 
closely held firms is to offer more standard forms.  LLCs currently 
are an open-ended standard form used by widely varying firms. 
Delaware law contemplates that parties will do a lot of tailoring, 
which invites many contractual loose ends. 
Additional standard forms would enable closely held firms to 
economize on contracting costs by finding default rules that better 
fit their needs.  For example, professional firms, very small general 
partnership-type firms, and startups considering eventually going 
public could have their own standard forms. 
Choice-of-law rules in the U.S. address some of the need for 
more standard forms by enabling firms to choose a business associa­
tion law from any of the fifty-one U.S. jurisdictions and count on 
having that law enforced in every other jurisdiction.  As discussed 
above, U.S. jurisdictions compete at least to the extent of trying to 
keep the larger local firms from organizing under Delaware law. 
Although there is little direct evidence that these efforts have paid 
off in more formations for the more innovative states,164 jurisdic­
tional choice has spurred legislative innovations. 
Even robust jurisdictional choice may not have produced an 
optimal number of forms.  There may be many more ways to deal 
with the problems addressed by oppression and buyout remedies 
than statutes now provide.  For example, statutes might “nudge” 
the parties toward more suitable contracts.165  The optimal number 
of default rules depends on a variety of factors, particularly includ­
ing lawyers’ and courts’ ability to produce an adequate “network” 
of form agreements, interpretations and case law to fully utilize the 
forms.166  Although additional forms may have a declining marginal 
value, it is difficult to determine the point at which the production 
164. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 85 (discussing the evidence that large 
LLC’s  are typically forming in Delaware, similar to large corporations). 
165. See Sneirson, supra note 139, at 915-18. 
166. See Larry E. Ribstein, Making Sense of Entity Rationalization, 58 BUS. LAW. 
1023, 1027-28 (2003). 
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of new standard forms should stop.  New forms always will be nec­
essary to keep up with changes in the contracting environment, and 
the value of a particular new form is rarely clear at the time it is 
promulgated.  For example, the LLC seemed to have little value 
from the time Wyoming first introduced it in 1977 until the tax 
changes thirteen years later.  Moreover, even if new forms may 
have little value, unsuccessful innovations may not impose substan­
tial costs.167 
A potential problem with relying solely on state legislatures to 
produce new forms is that they may not have very strong incentives 
to innovate.  Individual state legislators capture little of the reward 
from investing the time and effort necessary for crafting a standard 
form and having it enacted, may have many more valuable rent-
seeking opportunities, and risk harm to their reputations from un­
successful or unexpectedly costly statutes.168  Lawyers and bar 
groups have done much of the work in innovating standard forms 
and stand to earn rewards from capturing reputational benefits of 
spearheading legislation and creating increased legal business in 
their home states.169  But lawyers have incentives to benefit them­
selves at the expense of contracting parties, face free-rider 
problems in proposing legislation, and must make tradeoffs be­
tween the time they spend earning current fees and the time they 
invest in legislation.  It follows that there is room for a better sys­
tem of producing new private or statutory standard forms. Pos­
sibilities include strengthening currently weak intellectual property 
rights for privately generated standard forms.170 
167. See William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Anteced­
ents, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 855, 857-60 (1995). 
168. For discussions of legislators’ incentives to innovate, see Stephen Clowney, 
Property in Law, OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming); Brian D. Galle & Joseph Kieran Leahy, 
Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 57 EMORY L.J. 1301, 1333 (2009); Gillian 
Hadfield & Eric Talley, On Public Versus Private Provision of Corporate Law, 22 J. L. 
ECON. & ORG. 414, 416-19 (2006); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law as 
Byproduct: Theories of Private Law Production 3-5, 13 (Univ. of Cal. eScholarship, 
Working Paper, 2001) [hereinafter Law as Byproduct], available at http://escholarship. 
org/uc/item/9mg4g1dn;  Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Fed­
eralism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 593, 593-96 (1980). 
169. See Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licens­
ing, 69 MO. L. REV. 299, 330-37 (2004). 
170. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution 
25 (Univ. of Ill. College of Law, Working Paper No. LBSS11-03, 2011), forthcoming 53 
ARIZ. L. REV. no. 4 (2011); Law as Byproduct, supra note 168, at 25-27. 
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2. Better Lawyering 
Another way to improve closely held firm contracting technol­
ogy is through better lawyering both in advising on choice of law 
and form and crafting customized agreements.  Some of the sticki­
ness of the close corporation might be due to lawyers’ unwillingness 
to invest the time in learning about new contracting technologies as 
long as they can convince clients to stick with existing forms.  More­
over, the case law on application and interpretation of LLC agree­
ments indicates significant problems with the state of the drafting 
art, although the case law obviously is skewed toward problematic 
agreements.  Increasing competition in the legal profession171 may 
address these lawyering problems and lead to more innovation of 
legal tools. 
3. Private Adjudication 
Dissolution remedies so far have been fashioned by public 
courts.  The spread and development of arbitration and other pri­
vate dispute resolution172 may affect both contracting and adjudica­
tion in closely held firms.  Parties turning to arbitration may also 
turn to private forms and rely less on state-provided standard 
forms.  Arbitration also may reduce the amount of case law availa­
ble, thus reducing the benefits of using publicly provided standard 
forms. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Wilkes and similar close corporation cases are products of an 
earlier time when closely held firms lacked sophisticated and coher­
ent contracting technology and therefore needed significant judicial 
assistance to fill the significant gaps in their contracts. The corpo­
rate tax and constraints on the availability of limited liability forced 
closely held firms to compromise their various planning objectives. 
Many firms, like Springside Nursing, ended up trapped in a form 
that did not suit their needs.  Yet just as the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court was deciding Wilkes, the faraway Wyoming legisla­
ture was inventing a solution—a new business form called the lim­
ited liability company that has since swept the country. The ending 
of the age of the close corporation calls for new judicial approaches. 
171. See Larry E. Ribstein, Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 810-11 
(2010). 
172. See generally ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 
ch. 5 (2009). 
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Future developments are likely to have similar effects. Judicial 
opinions and statutes should fully reflect these changes in the legal 
environment of closely held firms. 
